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China’s rise and New Zealand’s 
interests: a policy primer for 2030 
 
Chris Elder and Robert Ayson 
 
Executive summary 
 
The emergence of China as an international power in the early decades of the 21st century is 
widely accepted as the consequence of economic, political and military trends which are already 
apparent today.  The familiar patterns of power centred on western predominance and American 
leadership will no longer offer the reassurance they once did.   
 
Dealing with a prosperous and powerful China, which is by no means a novelty in world history, 
is commonly accepted as the main foreign policy adjustment that needs to be made by all 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The effects of China’s rise on the global and Asia-Pacific 
regional order are likely to be the main preoccupations for New Zealand foreign policy-makers in 
the next twenty years and more.  
 
In this study, we seek to do three things. First, we examine what we believe China’s economic, 
political and military trajectory will resemble between now and the early 2030s. Second, we 
contemplate the effects that this trajectory for China will have on international institutions and 
Asia-Pacific regional affairs. Third, we propose a series of issues that New Zealand’s policy-
makers will need to bear in mind.  
 
In terms of the trajectory of China’s power, there is general consensus that China’s economy will 
continue to grow strongly, even if there are some significant challenges for its leaders to 
negotiate. The size of China’s population means its aggregate growth will surpass that of the 
USA long before GDP per capita equalises with that of the USA or other western economies. As 
both its wealth and external interests expand, China will also develop stronger military 
capabilities to defend those interests and to match its sense of prestige. China will be able to 
project power further from its boundaries, and friction with neighbours and regional powers may 
intensify.  
 
The manner of China’s assertion of its power will result in part from its style of government. 
Pressures on the Chinese Communist Party’s rule may grow from an expanding middle class and 
from any significant diminution of economic growth. But there seems currently no reason to 
expect China to move significantly closer to Western liberal democracy, even if more 
representative aspects are progressively introduced to governance.  
 
China’s increasing wealth and military power are likely to be accompanied by an extension of its 
influence with other countries and within international organisations. Having had no role in the 
establishment of post-War institutions, China is likely to assert greater influence in the 
development of existing institutions and the creation of any new groupings. Its combination of 
authoritarian government, strong national development and economic power may help 
developing countries negate the pressures they feel from leading western governments to follow 
a particular liberal capitalist model. International alignments may change: as countries within 
Asia become increasingly entwined with China’s economy, the balance of political influence may 
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also incline towards China, even if countries in northeast and southeast Asia maintain close 
security links with the United States. Like many of these countries New Zealand’s closest 
neighbour Australia will find itself pulled at the same time by economic factors to China and by 
security instincts to the US.  
 
We conclude that the main considerations and challenges for New Zealand policy-makers are 
likely to be questions of political judgement rather than economic consequence or strategic 
concern. First, rather than being comforted by the notion that New Zealand has a ‘special’ 
relationship with China, we need a broader domestic understanding of what dealing with a 
much stronger China will be like in the next twenty years. We need to consider what New 
Zealand’s changing demography, as a more Asian country in population terms including 
through Chinese immigration, means for our external engagement. We need to adjust to the 
reality of China’s growing South Pacific influence, seeking opportunities to encourage positive 
policy by Beijing rather than following any illusion of strategic denial. We need to apply an 
informed appreciation of our interests when we face numerous small but potentially significant 
tests of loyalty and alignment as the competition between a growing China and a still very 
powerful United States develops, tests which our partners in the region including in Southeast 
Asia will also face. We need to be aware that charting the best position for New Zealand in this 
evolving region will not necessarily be synonymous with taking an identical approach to 
Australia’s despite the importance of that bilateral relationship to us. And we need to continue to 
reach out beyond the Asia-Pacific region, including to Europe, to help manage our relationships, 
and protect our interests and values, as China’s influence over the standards of international 
behaviour develops.  
 
Above all, we need to put a premium on diplomatic nimbleness and our own capacity to assess 
what is best for New Zealand in a world which is going to be increasingly changed by China’s 
growing strength. This is not necessarily a world fraught with danger. New Zealand will be 
better off for China’s rise. In fact we already are. But it will be a demanding world and New 
Zealand will need to ensure it pays more attention to the qualities we need to prosper within it.  
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China’s rise and New Zealand’s 
interests: a policy primer for 2030 
 
Chris Elder and Robert Ayson 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The race is not always to the swift, the adage reminds us, but that’s the way to place your 
bets. On a similar principle, it is by no means certain that the decades ahead will confirm China 
as a preeminent international power, but on current trends that is very likely to be the case. While 
New Zealand can do little to influence the course of China’s economic and strategic development, 
it will be profoundly affected by the outcomes. It will be important to have a clear-sighted view 
of China’s likely place in the world in the medium to long term, and what this may mean for the 
way New Zealand conducts its own international business. That is not confined to the nature of 
our own bilateral relationship with China – it extends to a consideration of how China’s rise may 
affect the nature of international institutions, the economic and political models that now 
represent the norm, and the shape of the Asia-Pacific political and security environment. 
 
The discussion that follows sets out to consider how China and the world may look two decades 
into the future, and what this implies for New Zealand’s own strategic settings in the years 
ahead. We begin with the economic basis of China’s rise and the domestic political context in 
which this is occurring. We then turn to the growing regional and global effects of a stronger 
China before offering a series of judgements about what these changes mean for New Zealand’s 
policymaking. 
 
China’s growth 
 
Western perceptions of China were for many years coloured by images of a country in 
conflict, politically weak and economically backward. It is helpful to recall that China has existed 
as a state on the basis of the same core boundaries for more than 3000 years, and that for most of 
that time it has been the wealthiest country in the world. Its aggregate wealth has been a function 
of its very large population, but even in per capita terms its people were better off than those of 
any country in Europe until at least the 15th century. In the long sweep of the country’s history, it 
is not a prosperous and confident China that is atypical, but rather the impoverished and divided 
state that existed towards the end of the Qing dynasty and in the turbulent years that followed 
the dynasty’s downfall in the early years of the twentieth century. 
 
The economy 
Even during the unsettled period between the declaration of the People’s Republic of 
China in 1949 and the Cultural Revolution, China’s economy grew. Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) trebled between 1952 and 1978. Per capita income grew 180 per cent, and industry’s share 
of GDP rose from 8 per cent to 52 per cent, bringing the shape of China’s economy into line with 
the industrialised economies of the West. 
 
It was with the reforms instituted by Deng Xiaoping in 1980, however, that China’s economy 
took off. Between 1980 and 2010, real GDP grew at an average annual rate of 10 per cent, carrying 
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per capita GDP from US$205 in 1980 to about US$4,400 now. In the process, some 500 million 
people have been lifted above the poverty line – an achievement unparalleled in history. 
 
That breakneck pace of development will slow, but there is no reason to believe that the general 
trend will be reversed. The May 2011 Bloomberg Index for Developing Asia put China at the 
head of 22 emerging Asia economies as the country most likely to maintain steady and rapid 
growth over the following five years. China’s high score (76.2 per cent, as compared with runner-
up India’s 64.1 per cent) reflects a positive assessment of key factors contributing to market 
growth, including competitiveness, labour force quality, gross national savings as a percentage of 
GNP, and the growth of high technology exports. The IMF supports this analysis, predicting that 
China will become the world’s largest economy on a purchasing power parity basis in 2016. 
  
There is no shortage of economic commentators projecting a continuation of that positive growth 
trend well into the future. Prominent among them is Arvind Subramanian, of Washington’s 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, who argues that by 2030 China will generate 23.5 
per cent of world GDP, and the United States only 12 per cent. China will then stand alone as the 
wealthiest country in the world, even though the United States will still surpass it in per capita 
terms. While Subramanian’s predictions obviously build on a number of assumptions that may or 
may not hold true, it is noteworthy that as far as China in particular is concerned his starting 
point is remarkably moderate – an assumed growth rate of 5.5 per cent on a per capita basis, 3.3 
per cent slower than has actually been achieved over the past 20 years.  
 
China’s economic growth will undoubtedly hit some speed bumps over the next two decades. It 
will need to negotiate the ‘middle income trap’ that has seen many developing countries unable 
to make a transition from middle income to high income nation status because escalating costs 
undermine their competitiveness. The ‘demographic dividend’ that saw an abundant supply of 
young and productive workers through the early years of China’s rapid growth has plateaued, 
and will soon drop off sharply. The problem of increasingly severe environmental degradation 
will need to be addressed by remedying current abuses, and building in higher levels of 
environmental protection. Water will be a critical issue for China, with rivers and aquifers 
plundered and seriously polluted. 
 
What is noteworthy is that these have already been identified as serious constraints, and are 
being addressed, albeit often in a gradual and partial way. While the possibility of unforeseen 
developments radically changing the economic landscape can never be excluded, it is not 
apparent at this point that any of the problems identified pose a fundamental threat to China’s 
continued economic growth.  
 
The political system 
One suggested consequence of China’s economic growth is pressure for change in the 
authoritarian political system that has preceded and accompanied it. With much reduced levels 
of absolute poverty in China, providing for basic human needs is no longer the imperative that 
once it was. Recent years have seen the emergence of a sizeable middle class, the members of 
which might be expected to place greater value on freedom of expression, and the right to 
exercise more choice in selecting those who are to represent them. 
 
The Chinese Government faces the need to manage such expectations, and to avert possible social 
unrest stemming from an increasingly stark gap between the very rich and those still living in 
relative poverty. It is already finding its task more difficult because of unprecedented ease of 
communication within China with the advent of new technologies and social networking 
applications. 
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So far, those who have looked to China’s evolving social and economic situation to provide a 
platform for a shift towards Western-style liberal democracy have not seen their hopes realised. 
China is not evolving towards enlightenment values and liberal democracy, and there is as yet no 
real indication that it will. The Chinese Communist Party is still firmly in control of what remains 
effectively a one-party state. The state apparatus has little tolerance for dissent, and a short way 
with dissenters. 
 
China’s long history is one in which the voice of the people has consistently been subordinate to 
authority imposed from above. Typically periods when that authority was in abeyance were 
marked by struggle and disorder. There is no tradition of participatory democracy on the 
Western model, and there is a strong aversion to any possible breakdown of the authority that 
underpins orderly development.  
 
It is nonetheless observable that the same pragmatic outlook that set in train China’s economic 
resurgence informs a willingness to move gradually towards more transparent political 
processes, and allow greater popular participation through what has been termed ‘grassroots 
democracy’, to the extent this is compatible with maintaining overall control by the central 
authorities.  There are some tentative signs of a willingness to accord civil society the same 
legitimacy that economic enterprises now have.   Such evolution is more likely than a democratic 
revolution. The strong self-identification of party and state restricts the system’s ability to 
respond to change. 
  
The Chinese government is sometimes described as having a ‘Faustian compact’ with the people 
of China, whereby the people accept limitations on their political freedom in return for the 
government’s delivering increasingly high levels of material prosperity. To the extent that this is 
true, it reinforces the importance for China’s political stability of continuing strong economic 
growth. Conversely, as long as the economy does hold up, it may be expected that some version 
of the pact will remain operative. Assuming annual growth in the 5-9 per cent band predicted by 
many commentators, this may enable authorities to continue to maintain effective political 
control. Especially will this be so if economic growth is accompanied by a gradual trend towards 
a greater accord with civil society. 
 
One cautionary note that should be added to this analysis is that it is premised on a continuation 
of the style of Chinese leadership that has prevailed since Deng Xiaoping stepped down. China 
has been governed by a self-perpetuating meritocracy, technocratic, highly professional, but 
assiduously and, it appears, deliberately, lacking in personality. This has engendered a particular 
style of leadership – cautious, conservative and collective. That could all quickly change if there 
were to emerge another charismatic leader in the style of Mao or Deng. There is a strong 
possibility that any such leader would take China down a path that was nationalistic rather than 
liberal, as the triggers for achieving popular support would be likely to lie in that direction. 
China’s future course, and the strategic environment which will affect us all, might then look 
very different. 
 
Military capabilities 
China’s growing economic strength has been accompanied by an increase in its military 
capabilities, and this trend is set to continue. At least in the medium-term future, a primary 
objective for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will be to ensure a capability for what are 
described as ‘anti-access and area denial’ operations (to deter opposing forces from deploying or 
operating in areas close to China). Within 20 years the single aircraft carrier now being brought 
into service, largely for training purposes, will have been joined by 4-5 others, more suited to 
operational needs. China’s growing fleet of ballistic missile submarines will provide a credible 
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sea-based nuclear capability, and the two nuclear-powered attack submarines currently in 
operation will have been augmented by 4-5 more.  
 
Land-based ballistic and cruise missile systems are and will continue to be integral to China’s 
defence planning. Most notably it is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile with a range of some 
1500 km, the DF-21D, which will give the PLA the capability to attack large ships, including 
aircraft carriers, in the Taiwan Strait or the Western Pacific. In the air, it will be in a position to 
deploy the J-20 stealth fighter currently in development, although its capability is unlikely to 
match that of the United States equivalent. Overall, China is on track to achieve its goal of 
building a modern, regionally-focussed defence force by 2020. It is less obvious that, even by 
2030, it will have developed the ability or even the ambition to move beyond that to a capability 
for global reach or power projection. And the human and organisational software needed to 
animate the hardware is likely to be much slower to develop. 
 
Beyond conventional weaponry, China will be among the countries most adept in exploiting the 
possibilities of cyber warfare. The advent of cyberspace adds one more dimension to the global 
commons – sea, air and space. It is a dimension in which no state is at an absolute advantage by 
virtue of its size or resource base. It largely bypasses conventional strategic geography, since 
distance is no defence against cyber-attack. China is gradually eroding the advantage originally 
held by the West – not least because Chinese state-owned companies are designing and 
manufacturing more and more of the world’s digital infrastructure. The capability to attack 
computer networks offers the possibility of accessing or degrading information, and of targeting 
network-based logistics and communications systems. China has committed resources to harness 
advanced computer skills in order to place itself at the cutting edge of this new means of gaining 
an advantage in international conflict. China is also taking a different approach to the 
international governance of cyberspace. Exploiting the cyber domain is already part of China’s 
growing ability to raise the costs for United States military access to the air and sea perimeter of 
the Asian mainland. 
 
With expanded military capabilities, China will have the capacity to project power regionally, 
though probably not globally. In areas such as the South China Sea, it will have the sea and air 
power to back up its territorial claims. It will have the capability to mount a credible attack on 
Taiwan, turning the island’s defence into a very costly exercise. While it will not be equipped to 
assert a threat across the wider Asia-Pacific, it will be able to protect its own maritime approaches 
by denying access to others.  
 
China in the world 
 
Capacity for influence 
All the elements that go to make up the profile projected for China in 20 years’ time 
imply a considerably enhanced capacity for that country to influence attitudes and events beyond 
its borders. Economic strength has historically translated into political influence, because it brings 
with it the ability to affect economic outcomes in other countries, for better or for worse. 
Especially is this so when the country concerned has a strong involvement in international 
commerce. China’s voice will be influential by virtue of its position as a country commanding 
more than 20 per cent of the world economy, and something close to the same percentage of 
world trade. China’s greater military strength will also increase its international clout. Even if it 
does not adopt a bellicose attitude towards its neighbours and towards potential competitors for 
influence, that it has the capability of projecting military force will inevitably be a significant 
element in determining how it is perceived internationally.  
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Besides the hard power conveyed by economic and military strength, China will also be able to 
exercise at least some measure of soft power. For the first time, the world will be confronted with 
a dominant power whose population’s wealth, level of development and aspirations are more in 
accord with those of the Third world than the First. Few countries around the world will wish to 
replicate China’s political arrangements which remain dominated by the Communist Party. But 
some countries and peoples, especially in the developing world (and in other parts of the world 
feeling overlooked by the west), will find China’s rise politically helpful because it establishes an 
alternative model of strength. They will therefore be likely to share Beijing’s argument that a 
multipolar world of plural political systems is preferable to a one-size-fits all global model of 
liberal capitalism led by the United States and its western partners. 
 
China’s influence-building process will be assisted by a targeted programme of cultural 
diplomacy, and by an increasingly influential diaspora of recent emigrants. Advances in 
communication will create a situation in which, more than ever before, it is possible for emigrants 
from China to contribute to an adopted society while still remaining closely linked to their 
country of origin. While historically those who left China were in large part labourers who did so 
out of economic necessity, the present wave of emigration comprises predominantly young 
people seeking educational opportunities, and members of the educated middle class. Pride in 
the new China, coupled with reluctance to lose the right to a Chinese passport by taking 
citizenship of another country, will create ‘sojourners’ of a new sort – educated advocates of the 
values  of their country of origin, embedded in other societies and cultures. Against that there are 
many Chinese working for a time abroad (in Africa and the Middle East) who will not effectively 
be advertising Chinese soft power; and the reach of that power may be limited by its alien 
character outside East and Southeast Asia.  
 
China in the international system  
China’s greater international influence will be evident in the role it plays in multilateral 
diplomacy. The declaration of the People’s Republic of China was followed by a period during 
which China was relatively isolated from the mainstream of international society. It had no hand 
in shaping the form of the major international institutions which were established in the middle 
of the twentieth century, or in guiding their evolution. Through the period of its reintegration 
and rise to centrality in international affairs it has had to deal with institutions that reflect the 
values and promote the interests of the liberal democracies. As China’s international clout 
continues to grow, it is unlikely to be content to continue to work within this framework. 
 
In setting out to secure an institutional environment more conducive to its interests, China’s 
choices are broadly either to work within the present system, seeking where necessary to recast 
existing institutions in a way more in accord with its objectives, or to create new institutions that 
reflect China’s world view and aspirations. In practice, it is likely that the next 20 years will see 
elements of both options brought into play.  
 
The emergence of China as an effective champion of the interests of the developing world, and 
the coalitions it has been able to form around those interests, have in many cases changed the 
dynamic of the negotiating process. An example is the World Trade Organisation (WTO), where 
the longstanding ability of the developed Western nations to drive through agreement broadly in 
accord with their interests has met with a check. It has proved impossible to bring the Doha 
Round to a conclusion because China has made common cause with other developing countries 
to refuse a disadvantageous outcome. Similarly, in the field of climate change China has not 
allowed its status as one of the highest greenhouse gas emitters to deter it from campaigning 
vigorously for measures that protect the position of its BRIC – Brazil, Russia, India, China - 
partners and others in the developing world. 
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Over time, international institutions will be subject to change. That would have been the case 
even had China not emerged as an important international player. The United Nations and the 
major financial institutions, set up following World War II, have far outgrown their original 
memberships and operating environments. UN reform has long been on the international agenda 
(although the reform process appears effectively stymied). Other international organisations have 
similarly changed their profiles in a way that implies a need to revisit underlying structures and 
modes of operation. China’s arrival as an influential and economically powerful multilateral 
player will serve to accelerate a process that was in any case inevitable. 
 
After joining the WTO, for example, China initially focussed on implementing the commitments 
it had made at the time of accession, and building expertise in the workings of the organisation. 
With greater familiarity with the culture of the WTO China has developed an informed and 
sophisticated approach to pursuing its interests in areas such as dispute settlement. China has 
begun to engage actively in this arena as a means of testing the existing rules, and subjecting 
them to reinterpretation (perhaps as a precursor to seeking rule changes). Since 2009, more than 
half the cases initiated under disputes settlement procedures have involved China either as a 
complainant or a respondent.  
 
Gridlock in the WTO is encouraging the pursuit of trade goals through other means, notably 
bilateral and plurilateral negotiations leading to agreements limited to particular countries or 
groups of countries. The conclusion of an FTA between China and New Zealand in 2008 is one 
indication of China’s willingness to go down this route. If the WTO’s inability to re-invent itself 
does mean that trade policy action moves definitively to other approaches and other fora, China 
can be expected to assert a right to be involved from the outset. 
 
Reinforcing this is the fact that, in the years ahead, the nature of the trade policy agenda will 
change, as international trade itself takes on a different aspect. Physical borders will be less 
relevant to commercial enterprise: the changing face of technology will lead to a new generation 
of issues that reach into the domestic markets governing service areas like banking, education, 
and telecommunications. The rules establishing the basis for competition between domestic 
providers and foreign entities have largely yet to be written, and when they are China will, for 
the first time, be present at the formative stages. 
 
Like the WTO, the international financial institutions have traditionally been dominated by the 
interests of the liberal democracies, and, again like the WTO, they face increasing challenge from 
China and countries associated with it. That China will not forever be content to take a back seat 
in global financial management has been manifested through a number of acts and events. In 
2009 Central Bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan mused publicly about the possibility of 
establishing a ‘super sovereign’ currency based on a basket of currencies to replace the US dollar 
as the global medium of exchange. Later the same year, at the G20 summit, President Hu Jintao 
also called for a review of the global financial system. In the face of widespread opposition, China 
has not pursued the idea, but it has put the concept into play, and quietly pushes it forward from 
time to time within the IMF.  
 
The other component of the international economic system within which China is making its 
presence felt is the G20. The G20 has superseded the G8 as the world’s primary economic forum, 
in no small part precisely because it is more representative of current and emerging economic 
realities in its membership. China has the opportunity to steer its deliberations in directions that 
align with China’s world view, and it does so in the company of the BRICs, and with the 
potential support of an Asian bloc of five countries (six if Australia is included). 
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In the G20 China does not labour under the handicap of having achieved membership only after 
the rules and customs were well established – it has been a member since the group’s inception in 
1999. Other organisations and groupings are beginning to emerge in the formation of which 
China has played a large part, and which may in the future prove effective vehicles for 
promoting China’s vision and values. One of them is the BRICs - countries united by their size, 
their economic potential, and by the fact that they are in many respects marginalised in current 
economic structures. Another is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which has a 
geographical focus, bringing China and Russia together with four of the countries of Central Asia 
in a grouping that has important strategic and potentially economic implications. Of most current 
significance is the East Asia Summit (EAS), which includes both China and the United States, 
together with a cross-section of other countries, including New Zealand, whose interests and 
loyalties will not in the future necessarily align completely with one or the other. 
 
On the basis of the trends that have become increasingly evident through the period of China’s 
growing international ascendency, it is reasonable to assert that after another two decades have 
passed the main international and regional institutions may have a different cast than at present. 
Some may have become less relevant, or even disappeared altogether. Others will have changed 
their power structure and underlying assumptions to accommodate views that lie outside the 
mainstream thinking of the hitherto dominant powers, and closer to the illiberal market economy 
model represented by China. And there may exist new organisations that have their genesis in 
the beliefs and ambitions of an emerging generation of newly influential international actors, 
with China at their core. 
 
China and the United States 
Within the same time frame, great power relationships will take on a different aspect. 
The post-war world has been dominated by one or two major powers –  first, the Soviet Union 
and the United States, and then, following the fall of the Soviet Union, by the United States alone. 
With the rise of China, the United States’ unipolar moment is coming to an end. The prospect is 
that over the next twenty years economic ascendency will pass to China, and with it a large 
measure of the power to affect the course of events. 
 
China’s ascendency will not be as absolute as that of the United States has been for the past two 
decades. In particular, China is unlikely to challenge the United States’ military dominance, 
although it will narrow the gap, particularly if America’s willingness and ability to appropriate 
money for defence continues to wane. Even if United States defence spending does decline, 
however, affordability will place limits on China’s scope to compete. America’s current level of 
defence spending is five times that of China and approximately the same as the next 14 biggest 
spenders in the world. China could not seek to emulate such spending levels without placing on 
hold the plans for national development on which its government’s continuing legitimacy 
depends. 
 
It is precisely in this area – the creation of wealth as a nation – that China’s influence will grow, 
and it will, within a 20-year time frame, supplant the United States. Economic modellers differ on 
the pace of the transition, but few deny the trend. Subramanian projects that by 2030 China’s 
share of world GDP, on a purchasing power parity basis, will be 23.5 per cent, and the United 
States’ 11.8 per cent. A similar shift is predicted in shares of world trade, with China accounting 
for 15 per cent and the United States 7.3 per cent. Allied to these shifts is the possibility of a fully 
convertible renminbi succeeding the US dollar as the premier reserve currency. Already China is 
liberalising its current account and allowing the RMB to be used in border trade close to home. 
How soon the RMB becomes an international currency will depend in large part on the pace of 
domestic financial market liberalisation. 
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While at times it is a lagged transition, economic dominance does generally translate into more 
broadly based political power. When China is in a position to influence other countries’ patterns 
of growth and trade, and even their economic viability, it would be surprising if it did not use 
those levers to promote international outcomes in keeping with its interests. (Indeed, this is a 
process that is already under way). 
   
China’s rise to economic supremacy will accordingly have profound implications for the way 
other countries relate to it, and to each other. The most far-reaching change, and the most 
important from New Zealand’s point of view, is that at some stage the Asia-Pacific will no longer 
be an area of American strategic dominance. To the extent that China’s rise is accompanied by a 
more intense and sustained era of strategic competition with the United States, the countries of 
the Asia-Pacific region, including New Zealand, will face some challenging choices about where 
their loyalties and the their national interests lie. 
 
From the time of the Second World War, the United States has, through its military presence and 
its active diplomatic engagement, been a force against potentially destabilising influences in the 
Asia-Pacific region. While there have been instances of contention or threatened contention – on 
the Korean peninsula, in Vietnam, in the Taiwan Strait - by and large countries have been able to 
develop in a peaceful and stable environment. For most, this has required a willingness to get 
along with the United States, and at least pay lip service to the systems and ideals promoted by 
that country. 
 
It is unlikely that the same comfortable situation will obtain in 20 years’ time, despite the 
renewed United States commitment signalled by its ‘pivot’ (or ‘rebalancing’) to the Asia-Pacific 
since the second half of 2011. As China’s economic strength and capacity to bring political 
pressure to bear comes to parallel or surpass that of the United States, it will not be content to 
allow American influence to predominate in what China regards as its neighbourhood. In a 
continuation of a process that has already begun, China will compete actively for the attention 
and the support of the countries of the Asia-Pacific. 
 
The stage is accordingly set for competition for influence between China and the United States in 
the decades ahead. As some commentators have argued, it is neither desirable nor inevitable that 
this competition should be informed by the less desirable aspects of international contention – 
military rivalry and a zero-sum approach to economic interaction. It is possible to envisage a 
relatively amicable sharing of power and responsibility between the state that has played a 
predominant role over the past seven decades, and the state that is set to exercise increasing 
influence in the years ahead. 
 
What makes that scenario less likely is that it requires a backward step on the part of the United 
States. America would need to cede influence to China, acknowledging that in a part of the world 
where its writ has run large it will in the future be co-responsible with China. This runs counter 
to a deeply-felt perception within the United States that America is the pre-eminent and 
indispensable actor in international affairs. In terms of domestic politics, it would be hard to sell. 
 
There is no likelihood of this happening in the foreseeable future. Recent actions and statements 
by leading figures of the current administration affirm United States leadership while at the same 
time acknowledging the importance and novelty of the United States being able to craft a 
mutually satisfactory relationship with the rising power, China.  In March 2012 Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton said:  ‘The US is attempting to work with a rising power to foster its rise as an 
active contributor to global security, stability and prosperity while also sustaining and securing 
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American leadership in a changing world<.This is uncharted territory. And we have to get it 
right, because so much depends on it’. 
 
The point has already been reached, therefore, where two major powers are contending for 
regional influence. That contention is likely to be a constant in international relations over the 
coming decades. In broad terms it will be an asymmetrical struggle, in which one side has the 
military ascendency, and the other the economic, although it is possible to conceive of pockets of 
military advantage accruing to China, and the United States will not soon relinquish some areas 
of economic advantage, and may recover ground in others. It is a struggle that will require great 
nimbleness on the part of smaller players such as New Zealand, both in managing their 
relationships with the dominant players, and in interacting with other powers which will face the 
same dilemma in structuring their affairs. 
 
Shifting international relationships 
In the days of the domino theory (in the 1950s and 1960s), a fear shared by the United 
States and many Southeast Asian states was that variations of Chinese communism would, 
through ideological infiltration and force of arms, become established in the countries of 
Southeast Asia. It was, for a time, a legitimate fear, but its validity waned as China’s appetite for 
exporting revolution gave way to a more pragmatic concern to pursue national development in a 
stable regional environment. Concern about possible military incursions is now particular rather 
than general, and felt mainly by countries such as Vietnam, which shares a common border with 
China, and has recent experience of Chinese belligerence.  
 
The fear now, if it can be so described, is rather of economic domination, as China invests heavily 
in the region, moves to sequester its natural resources, and incorporates Southeast Asian 
manufactures in its own supply chains. Following the conclusion of the ASEAN/China Free 
Trade Agreement in 2010, China’s annual share of ASEAN exports has risen to US$113.5 billion 
and Chinese investment in the region is now estimated at US$12.5 billion with half of that coming 
in 2010-11.  
 
Economic integration at this level is a two-edged sword. On the one hand it lessens Southeast 
Asian countries’ command of important economic levers, and threatens to confer upon China the 
political power that is engendered by economic dominance. On the other, it offers to Southeast 
Asian countries the same path to growth that China itself has pursued. Chinese investment will 
create economic opportunities, the Chinese market an outlet for intermediate goods and fully-
manufactured exports. Despite fears of ‘Finlandisation’, it is hard to see the governments of 
Southeast Asia turning their backs on the opportunities economic interaction with China will 
afford in the years ahead.  
 
None of this is to say that China will have totally supplanted the United States in the region 
within 20 years. The United States has made plain its intention to maintain and build upon its 
engagement, and the ASEAN countries will, with differing degrees of enthusiasm, welcome its 
continued presence as a counterweight to China’s influence. America will remain an important 
market for goods from the region, both directly and via further processing in China. Its naval 
presence will carry on making a significant contribution to regional security. But China’s 
economic strength will be supplemented by three important considerations: its geographical 
proximity to Southeast Asia, the interlinking relationships that have historically seen many 
Southeast Asian countries acknowledging China’s suzerainty, and the significant commercial 
presence of overseas Chinese in most Southeast Asian economies. 
 
CSS Discussion Paper No.11, 2012                                                                        10 
Feeding in to the mix of altered relationships likely to obtain in Asia is the question of what 
stance other important Asian countries – South Korea, Japan, India – may adopt. The first two are 
committed to formal defence arrangements with the United States. These have underpinned their 
security since the 1950s, and have provided them with a nuclear shield that has arguably been 
instrumental in preventing either country itself going nuclear. Both host United States military 
bases that have long been regarded as a tripwire against Chinese aggression. It is unlikely that 
either South Korea or Japan will soon give up the reassurance afforded by their military alliance 
with the United States. 
 
On the economic front, however, it is a different story. Both countries have moved from 
overwhelming trade and economic dependence on the United States to strong links with their 
much closer neighbour, China. For both Japan and the South Korea, total trade with China has 
surpassed their total trade with the United States. 
    
The factors underlying that reversal – geographical proximity, China’s emergence as a major 
manufacturing base, the extensive market afforded by its increasingly affluent consumers – will 
grow rather than diminish in importance over the next 20 years. They will be buttressed by a 
more clear cut framework if negotiations now under way towards a free trade agreement 
between China, Japan and South Korea conclude successfully. The stage is set for an increasingly 
complex set of political and economic interrelationships in Northeast Asia, affecting not just the 
way Japan and South Korea relate to China and the United States, but also how they relate to one 
another, to the ASEAN countries, and to Australia and New Zealand. 
 
At the heart of these shifting relationships is the question of whether United States’ national 
interest in East Asia is sufficient to keep it as closely engaged in security terms in the region in 
twenty years’ time as it is in 2012. On current trends, the United States interest in doing so will be 
matched in the region, precisely because of a wish among many Asian countries to balance or 
hedge against the impact of China’s economic and political power. The Korean reunification or 
an ‘administrative’ solution of Taiwan might change that dynamic, although it is hard to foresee 
any circumstances in which Japan would surrender its close security links with the United States. 
 
India has tended to find itself in China’s shadow. Over the next 20 years, however, its own 
economic growth will assure it of increasing prominence in regional and global affairs, while at 
the same time it also faces some real challenges. The Bloomberg index ranks India’s medium-
term growth prospects second only to China among emerging Asian economies. And in one 
important social indicator, it will exceed China. The United Nations Population Commission 
estimates that in 2025 India’s population will have reached 1.459 billion, compared to China’s 
1.395 billion. For the first time in history, China will not be the world’s biggest nation, measured 
by population. 
 
This shift will not necessarily be to India’s advantage, as it struggles to provide for the extra 
numbers, but in psychological terms its world view, and the dynamics of its bilateral relationship 
with China, will undergo what may well be a profound change. Newly affluent, the world’s most 
populous country, and a nuclear power, India can be expected to be increasingly assertive in its 
international dealings. It will be the most credible competitor to China’s claim to regional 
supremacy. 
 
India should not be viewed solely through the prism of its future relationship and possible 
competition with China. As in China’s case, the scale of its development is such that it will be 
integral to the strategic planning and future prosperity of countries even as geographically 
removed as Australia and New Zealand. But how India relates to China in future will affect 
CSS Discussion Paper No.11, 2012                                                                        11 
profoundly the strategic outlook for the region and for the world. India, like China, will be 
determined to retain its strategic independence. It sees itself as a candidate for great power 
status, and as China’s peer. It will not adopt a subsidiary role, but will engage China on the basis 
of its own capabilities, and in its own time frame. 
 
Australia and the island countries of the South Pacific have already been considerably affected by 
China’s changing role in the region. That process is set to continue. Australia faces strong and 
conflicting pressures as it contemplates how best to position itself in future. On the one hand, it 
has chosen to commit itself even more strongly to a military alliance with the United States that 
provides the underpinning for its approach to most matters relating to defence and security. On 
the other, it is increasingly dependent on China as a market, particularly for its mineral exports 
and some commentators have expressed concern that its economy is to a considerable extent 
hostage to that trading relationship. 
 
Australia has since the Second World War been one of the United States’ most resolute allies in 
the Asia-Pacific region. On the basis of the ANZUS alliance, it has built a strong and multi-
faceted network of defence and intelligence links. Its strategic vision differs from that of New 
Zealand by virtue both of its size and its geographical position. Australia conceives of itself as a 
medium power, and its resource base has up to the present allowed it to maintain a defence 
profile in keeping with that vision. Geographically adjacent to potential sources of instability in 
Asia, it has experienced direct military threat in a way New Zealand has not. Australia’s value to 
the United States in enhanced by its exposure to the Indian Ocean, increasingly a focus for 
defence cooperation. Having assessed that its security interests are best met by a strong military 
alliance with the United States, Australia has been steadfast in pursuing that role, to the point of 
at times being perceived by Asian neighbours as a surrogate for United States power in the 
region. 
 
In November 2011 the alliance was further strengthened by Australia’s decision to allow major 
increases in United States military activities in Australia, including the gradual deployment of a 
2,500-strong marine taskforce in the Northern Territory, advanced training, and more visits by 
United States warships and strike aircraft. A report prepared by former defence secretaries Allan 
Hawke and Ric Smith in advance of the next Australian defence white paper – now brought 
forward a year to 2013 - advocates building on this by encouraging the United States to operate 
more nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers out of Australian naval bases. 
 
The most recent upgrading of Australia/United States defence cooperation is not necessarily 
directed towards the containment of China, although some in Australia have voiced concern that 
China may perceive it in that light. It does, however, send a strong signal as to how Australia 
plans to position itself strategically in the years to come. While it is in one sense simply an 
operational decision, in another it is a clear commitment to a strong United States military 
presence in the Asia-Pacific over the long term. Viewed in that light, its implications for 
Australia’s future role in the Asia-Pacific extend beyond the purely military, and perhaps even 
beyond what was intended at the time the decision was taken.  
 
The other side of the coin for Australia is its now very extensive economic interaction with China. 
That reaches into all parts of the economy, including the labour market, and the sale of services, 
notably education, but it is seen at its most stark in Australia’s dependence on China as a market 
for exports of minerals. The receipts from exports of these commodities are of central importance 
to Australia’s economic growth – in 2010 resource exports made up 57 per cent of Australia’s 
total export receipts. In that year, almost 70 per cent of iron ore exports went to China, and 18 per 
cent of coal exports. In 2010, 37 per cent of Australia’s total resource exports went to China.  
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To some extent the dependence runs both ways. China needs the raw materials it imports from 
Australia as inputs to its own exports, and its massive programme of domestic construction. It is 
not, however, a balanced equation. Australia’s vulnerability to shifts in bilateral trade flows is 
much greater than is that of the huge Chinese economy. Australia’s dependence on China as an 
economic partner, already pervasive, continues to grow. It is hard to see that trend being 
reversed in the decades ahead, and if it is not China’s economic interests with Australia will 
increasingly be a factor in the broader bilateral relationship, and in how Australia relates to other 
countries in the region. 
 
In the South Pacific, China’s presence is now pervasive, and is likely to continue to grow. While 
China has diplomatic relations with (and embassies in) just eight of the island countries 
belonging to the Pacific Islands Forum (the other six recognise Taiwan) it already has more 
diplomats posted in the South Pacific than New Zealand and Australia combined. It is now the 
third biggest aid donor to the region. Its total aid expenditure is difficult to quantify because of a 
lack of transparency within the Chinese system. It also provides grants and – controversially – 
soft loans to various Pacific Island countries. China is also a major trading partner - in 2010 two-
way trade with Pacific Island countries reached a new high of US$3.66 billion. 
 
There is no reason to believe that China’s motives in seeking closer engagement with the Pacific 
island states are significantly different from the reasons it is building links in other parts of the 
world. Beyond denying Taiwan, it wants to build the network of linkages with states great and 
small that befits a global power. It seeks to create the conditions that will allow it to make 
common cause with developing countries in international fora. And it wants to secure long-term 
access to natural resources such as fish and timber. 
 
China has supported its diplomatic advances with soft diplomacy and with aid. Its position of 
principle that all states are equal has led to Pacific leaders being feted in Beijing with a degree of 
pomp beyond their experience elsewhere. China’s willingness to disburse aid on prestige projects 
that would not necessarily recommend themselves to Western donors, and to do so swiftly and 
without conditionality, has similarly raised its standing.  
 
China’s seemingly inexorable rise has been the subject of renewed attention on the part of the EU 
and of individual European countries. That attention will continue and grow over the next two 
decades, especially if China moves to address some of the human rights concerns that have at 
times blocked more thoroughgoing engagement. Nonetheless, Europe will not lack issues to 
address closer to home– the integration of a more and more disparate group of countries, 
avoiding the emergence of a two-tier Europe, managing monetary union, and dealing with the 
long-term effects of the Eurozone crisis. Faced with all these challenges, Europe’s primary focus 
will continue to be Europe. 
 
While Europe’s engagement with China and its Asian neighbours may be selective and not 
always fully committed, Europe will provide an important benchmark because it is the repository 
of many of the norms and values that have come to be embodied in the international institutions. 
In some cases it has strengthened its capacity to promote those norms by laying claim to 
particular roles, such as the convention that Europe should always furnish the President of the 
IMF. Even if Asia’s interaction with Europe is in some respects limited, Asia will come up against 
European norms, values, and attitudes at one remove through participation in these institutions. 
 
The China model 
China’s rise to a position of international prominence will confer upon it ‘structural 
power’, defined by Lisa Toohey as ‘the power to set agendas, to shape the normative frameworks 
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within which states relate to one another, and to change the range of choices open to others 
without putting pressure directly on them’. It will invest China also with what might be termed 
‘demonstrative power’ – the power to bring other states within its orbit by establishing itself as a 
role model through the demonstrated success of its political structures and economic policies.  
 
Through most of the twentieth century, it was the established wisdom that the model afforded by 
the developed Western democracies was that to which the less developed countries of the world 
would aspire. The fall of the Soviet Union made that conviction absolute in the minds of many. 
China’s remarkable success, and its disinclination to embrace neo-liberal norms, is not in accord 
with this thesis. Alternative theories have arisen to accommodate the development path of China 
as an authoritarian capitalist state. Political scientist Azar Gat suggests that there is no reason 
why China should not continue to prosper as a non-democratic great power. In Gat’s analysis, 
while capitalism is a necessary part of development, democracy is not. He suggests that it was a 
simple contingency, the emergence of the United States as ‘the world’s largest concentration of 
economic and military might’, rather than any inherent advantage in the democratic system, that 
gave the liberal democracies the edge through the twentieth century. 
 
If one accepts that there is no inevitability in the march towards Western-style democracy, and 
that the direction of China’s political development is likely to owe less to Western practice than to 
its own assessment of how best to promote political legitimacy in combination with the effective 
exercise of power, the world in 2030 will once more be faced with competing approaches to 
governance. For many developing countries, the lessons afforded by China may appear the more 
pertinent. 
 
As China’s wealth and prestige continue to grow, it will tend to be perceived as a demonstration 
of what can be achieved without close adherence to the principles of the Western democratic 
tradition. Its success will act as a magnet to countries still at the developmental stage. Some elites 
will find comfort in China’s example as they seek a continued hold on power. And for some of 
the countries close to China, who share aspects of China’s civilisation and values, the opportunity 
to draw upon a system based on ’Asian values’ such as non-interference by states in others’ 
political systems, and primacy of the community over the individual, will have its own attraction. 
 
China is not driven by any sense that it has a mission to promulgate its ideology beyond its 
borders. (In this respect it differs from the Soviet Union, and, arguably, the United States.) 
China’s dealings with other countries are directed rather towards underpinning its physical and 
economic security. Nonetheless, it can see clearly enough that its way in the world will be eased 
if it is able to create a coterie of states which subscribe to broadly similar principles of governance 
and approaches to development. It discreetly encourages others to move towards closer 
alignment through trade, through soft diplomacy, and through the provision of various sorts of 
assistance. 
 
Even though China is not setting out to change the behaviour of the developing countries with 
which it engages, it is in fact creating an environment in which they can plot a new path, one that 
takes them away from the templates prescribed for them by the United States and Europe. Many 
of the developing nations have chafed under what they perceive to be the patronising and self-
serving advice of developed countries, in some cases their former colonial masters. This 
resentment has been fuelled further by attempts to use trade and investment as a lever to secure 
sensitive political changes. The appearance of a new partner that imposes no conditions save that 
of commercial viability (and a nod towards the One China policy), lessens the pressure to bring 
policies into line with the values of the developed West, and engenders a disposition to look 
instead at aspects of the accommodating, and apparently successful, alternative. 
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Through all their dealings with China, its business partners in the developing world are exposed 
not just to a different approach to government and economic management, but also to the 
constant values and assumptions upon which China’s practice is built. Many have more to do 
with what it is to be Chinese than with competing systems of governance. They emphasise the 
collective over the individual, economic and social rights over civil and political rights, a 
preference for mediation rather than resort to legal process, and a willingness to see events play 
out over a very long time frame.  
 
It would be too much to predict that within another 20 years the world will find itself once again 
divided into blocs reflecting competing political and economic systems. But it is already clear that 
one suggested scenario, gradual convergence towards the model of Western liberal democracy, is 
very unlikely. China’s emergence will present an alternative vision. Even if other states do not 
choose to follow China’s path, they will not feel constrained to aspire to the Western model. 
Setting the rules of the international community will be a more complex business as a result. 
 
The challenges for New Zealand 
 
This is the multifaceted, confused, and confusing situation that New Zealand is going to 
have to negotiate in the years ahead. It faces the need to find its own means of accommodating 
the rise of China as a major power in the region, and the changed strategic balance that is 
emerging as a result. Over the past half century New Zealand has benefited from the Pax 
Americana that has ruled in the Asia-Pacific region. This has been so even though its relationship 
with the United States has been at times difficult, notably in the defence area, where the United 
States suspended bilateral military cooperation under the ANZUS treaty following New 
Zealand’s anti-nuclear decisions of 1984.  
 
As that security relationship has warmed in recent years, bilateral security and defence relations 
are now largely unimpeded by the 1980s dispute. This improvement has built on shared 
opposition to terrorism after 9/11 and New Zealand’s commitment in Afghanistan.  A new level 
of New Zealand/United States engagement has its most formal statement in the Wellington 
Declaration of November 2010, which committed the two countries to ‘a new focus on practical 
cooperation in the Pacific region; and enhanced political and subject matter dialogue’. This has 
recently been supplemented with the signature of the Washington Declaration on closer defence 
relations. The United States has also paid greater attention to regional architecture, including 
positioning itself to be a member of the EAS, increased engagement with the Pacific Island 
countries, and active commitment to the Trans-Pacific Partnership. It is reasonable to assume that  
the United States’ comprehensive re-engagement owes as much to a wish to counter China’s 
influence as it does to a desire to place its relations with New Zealand (and other countries in the 
Asia-Pacific) on a more reasonable footing. 
 
At the same time as there has been a return to a significant level of defence cooperation with the 
United States, New Zealand has initiated military contacts with China. There is cooperation on 
training programmes, and annual staff college exchanges are undertaken. There is scope for New 
Zealand to build on these initial contacts to achieve a greater understanding of China’s military 
objectives and what challenge they may pose to countries in the Western Pacific. 
 
China’s economic influence extends to New Zealand, although so far the level of dependence is 
not so acute as Australia’s. China takes around 13 per cent of New Zealand’s commodity exports, 
less than half the Australian percentage. New Zealand’s exports are not grounded in the minerals 
sector in the same way, and there are potential alternative markets, offering New Zealand the 
possibility of a strategic decision to diversify. Nonetheless, China has become central to the New 
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Zealand economy. In calendar year 2011 China moved past Australia to become New Zealand’s 
largest source of imports (NZ$7.05 billion). It was second only to Australia as an export market 
(NZ$5.9 billion). The rise has been rapid, and one of the countries that has made way for China 
on the export table is the United States. 
 
The rise in goods trade has been paralleled by increases in the sale of services like education and 
tourism. Investment levels in both directions are rising, and may be expected to continue to do so 
quite rapidly as a logical concomitant of the intense trading relationship. Some of the negative 
publicity about aspects of that investment, including over dairy farm ownership, are out of 
proportion to its still limited level. But if New Zealand is not actually coming into economic thrall 
to China, it is certainly already in a situation where any major disruption to its economic links 
with China would create a need for major and painful adjustments. 
 
On present settings New Zealand will, in 20 years’ time, need to frame its policies in the light of a 
complex and pervasive set of economic interrelationships with China, including the impact of 
growing Chinese migration to New Zealand. Sitting behind that economic reality will be another 
reality: that of a China capable of projecting power beyond its immediate neighbourhood, and 
disinclined to cede influence in its own part of the world. Both of these realities will derive from 
China’s ability to manage successfully its own internal political processes and policies affecting 
economic development. And to the extent that China is able to carry that off, it will provide a 
model that may well promote a third reality New Zealand will need to take into account – the 
reality of a developing world beyond China that takes China’s success as a vindication of 
plurality in governance and economic management.  
 
China's rise will bring about a fundamental and a broad-based reshaping of the international 
environment. Existing alignments will come into question, together with the assumptions upon 
which they are based. New and different power structures and centres of economic activity will 
come to the fore. For a small country like New Zealand, the struggle to make headway in a world 
stripped of many of the certainties that have ordered international dealings will present a 
complex and difficult challenge.  
 
In this shifting environment, the challenge for some countries will be to manage events and direct 
outcomes into the channels that best suit their interests. Except in particular and very limited 
circumstances, New Zealand will not be one of them. It has neither the political and military heft, 
nor the economic power, to affect the course of global events in any fundamental way. It will 
have to plot its course as best it can in response to circumstances over which it has little control.  
 
The first challenge for New Zealand, accordingly, is simply to recognise the fact that while it will 
always be in an international environment that will largely be shaped by the actions of others, the 
main shapers of that environment will be a different mix to the more comfortable patterns that 
have pertained in recent generations. This requires those framing New Zealand's external policy, 
and the community more generally, to accept that the patterns of association, and the value 
systems, that have underpinned our foreign policy decision-making throughout the post-war 
period are no longer to be relied upon to the same extent. The process will from now on become a 
great deal more complex, the trade-offs less easily arrived at. 
 
An associated task will be to build the best possible understanding of the international 
environment, its underlying drivers and the levers of change. The more New Zealand 
understands about how the world in which it must operate is being shaped, the better placed it 
will be to frame its policies in a way that delivers maximum national benefit, or in a less 
optimistic scenario minimises potential damage. 
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In addition, there are a number of practical ways in which New Zealand can position itself to best 
advantage in response to China's rise. 
 
Develop an excellent understanding of China, and a truly strategic approach to the relationship 
The current situation is without precedent in New Zealand's external dealings. Until the 
emergence of China (and with the limited exception of Japan) all New Zealand's leading strategic 
and economic relationships have been with countries operating within the parameters of the 
Western democratic tradition. They are countries - the United Kingdom, the United States, 
Australia - with which New Zealand shares a common heritage, a common language and 
common, although not always identical, values. It has been possible to work together on the basis 
of clear understandings and easy communication. 
 
That is not the case with China. Its rise to a position of central importance for New Zealand has 
been very rapid, and the development of a base of mutual familiarity has not kept pace. Unless 
New Zealand works to set that base in place, the relationship will not deliver all that potentially it 
might, in either economic or political terms.  
 
New Zealand is apt to flatter itself that it enjoys a 'special relationship' with China. It is not alone 
in this: it is a tribute to China's diplomacy that so many countries lay claim to a relationship that 
is in some way 'special'. It is true that New Zealand has been able to exploit some of the 
advantages of being small -  rapid decision-making, a relative lack of special interest groups, and 
a capacity to take decisions without reflecting overmuch on their wider consequences - to be the 
first developed country to achieve agreement with China in a number of areas (the 'four firsts'). 
But these examples of successful small power diplomacy are not in themselves enough to place 
the relationship on a stable, long-term footing.  
 
It is particularly important that New Zealand’s relations with China not be seen as based simply 
on trade and business, with few other dimensions. To describe New Zealand’s relations with 
China as ‘purely commercial’ is unhelpful, and an unreliable pointer to the course along which 
the relationship must develop if it is to achieve depth and resilience. For China, worthwhile 
bilateral relationships require to have substance beyond the purely commercial. For New 
Zealand to sustain that wider relationship the next generation of political leaders, journalists, 
academics and opinion leaders need to know China well. We also need to foster dealings with 
China across the broad spectrum of national life extending to culture and sport and beyond.  
 
At a governmental level, New Zealand has for more than 30 years maintained a by and large 
successful strategic approach to its dealings with China, underpinned by frequent ministerial 
visits, regular meetings of China-based New Zealand representatives, a gradual expansion of 
representation in-country, the pursuit of mutually beneficial agreements such as the free trade 
agreement, and a good level of interagency cooperation which is codified in the recent NZ Inc 
China Strategy. It will be particularly important, over the time when China assumes a decisive 
role on the world stage, to lock in the gains made when competition for China’s attention was not 
so intense, for example by preserving access for talks between foreign ministries on a regular 
basis.  
 
To the extent that New Zealand does have any special standing in the eyes of Chinese decision-
makers, it owes it in large part to the professionalism with which it has approached the 
practicalities of diplomatic representation. It from the first numbered itself among the small 
group of countries committed to a Chinese language programme in order to ensure its posts were 
staffed with competent Chinese speakers. (Four of the last five New Zealand ambassadors to 
Beijing, and all five consuls-general in Shanghai, have been Chinese speakers with one or more 
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previous postings in China.) This commitment is not without cost, but it should be maintained, 
along with the pursuit of China-focussed career structures. 
 
There are and will continue to be issues on which the commonly-held values of New Zealand 
society and the Chinese Government’s view of what is expedient and appropriate to China’s 
circumstances are sharply at odds. At governmental level, New Zealand has been able to convey 
its concerns to China and to have them acknowledged, in part because it is able to call on the 
ballast of a broadly constructive bilateral relationship. The New Zealand Government should not 
shrink from making its views known, and it should ensure that it is equipped with a base of 
knowledge and understanding that will allow it to engage on such points of difference in a frank, 
direct and constructive manner. 
 
A legacy of misunderstanding and prejudice has at times entered public discussion of issues 
relating to China. Time and personal experience will play as great a role in redressing this as 
anything the government can do. Nonetheless, there is clearly a continuing role for organisations 
such as the Asia New Zealand Foundation in promoting greater knowledge and understanding, 
and even more importantly a need for an assertive and vigorous expansion of the teaching of 
Chinese history, language and culture in the school system, building in part on the growing 
numbers of immigrant children. The object should not be to create a nation of Sinophiles, but to 
achieve an understanding and a rapport that enriches New Zealand’s multiracial society, and 
allows bilateral dealings with China to go forward untrammelled by ignorance or prejudice.  
 
The New Zealand Government owes it to itself to promote another sort of knowledge also. There 
is a need to collect and codify more systematically than at present information about China’s 
presence and assets in New Zealand. In this way it will be better placed to appreciate possible 
vulnerabilities and opportunities. What are the likely long-term consequences of Chinese 
migration? Is there an obvious strategy behind China’s economic interventions in New Zealand, 
and if so, how does that affect our interests? 
 
It would be quite unrealistic to set about trying to engender a similarly deep level of 
understanding in reverse, by promoting knowledge of New Zealand in China. China has many 
suitors, all with their own claims on its attention. It will nevertheless be important to continue to 
seek to ensure that those in China who make decisions relating to New Zealand interests do so 
against a background of all relevant information (or at least all relevant information supportive of 
the New Zealand case). It will add substance to the relationship to draw attention to aspects of 
New Zealand experience relevant to China’s own concerns (for instance safeguarding the rights 
of ethnic minorities). And at a political or diplomatic level, China’s growing global influence will 
make it the more important that New Zealand convey its views quite candidly on a range of 
issues important to the international community. 
 
Shape domestic policies to accommodate the reality of an increasingly close relationship with 
China 
The speed with which the relationship with a hitherto unfamiliar partner has grown has 
implications for policy settings within New Zealand, as well as for those governing the country’s 
international dealings. Inward investment from China is one issue that has the potential to trigger 
discord if it is not handled in an appropriate way. A perception that Chinese investors are 
regarded differently from investors from other countries could sour the attitude both of potential 
investors and of the Chinese authorities. In the face of recent instances that, rightly or wrongly, 
have tended to promote that perception, New Zealand would do well to expend real effort to 
establish clear rules around foreign investment, and to apply them consistently. 
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In the years ahead there is going to be a great deal of Chinese capital looking for investment 
opportunities abroad. New Zealand will be an attractive destination because it is perceived as 
safe, and because it offers the possibility of achieving stable access to the food supplies and other 
resources that China will be hard put to secure in sufficient quantities within its own borders. At 
the same time, the New Zealand economy will face a real need for capital to finance 
development, and it will have no choice but to look offshore for that investment. 
 
By ensuring that it has in place a transparent investment regime that is non-discriminatory and 
free from the possibility of political interference, New Zealand will establish the essential 
condition for encouraging a flow of Chinese investment to this country. That the regime may 
include safeguards for strategic assets or particular classes of enterprise is not a primary concern 
– China itself imposes similar safeguards. What is important is that potential investors from 
China should be able to proceed on a basis of reasonable certainty, and in confidence that they 
are competing on an equal footing with other applicants. 
 
Immigration is another case in point. Over the next 20 years, the Chinese diaspora will continue 
to grow. Statistics New Zealand figures suggest New Zealand’s total Asian-born population 
could grow to reach around 15 per cent of the total population by 2030. If current trends 
continue, the largest proportion of that number will be Chinese. Suitably qualified people will 
choose to emigrate here, they will raise their children here, and in many cases their families will 
be augmented by older family members entering under reunification provisions. That is not in 
itself remarkable: it is the way New Zealand’s population has been built up since the earliest days 
of European settlement. What is noteworthy about the development now foreseen is that it will 
within a short time frame create a large group within New Zealand society that is differentiated 
from the majority population in terms of first language, cultural background, and experience. It 
will be without recent precedent in terms of its scale, rapidity, and the degree of difference that 
requires to be negotiated. 
 
Handled correctly, this will enrich New Zealand society, bringing new perspectives, enterprise, 
and energy, as well as providing a valuable bridge back to China. Handled with insufficient care, 
it has the potential to polarise groups within the community, to nurture resentment on the one 
hand, and estrangement on the other, and to create within New Zealand a new generation who 
are constantly weighing their sense of commitment to their new home against their attachment to 
their country of origin. New Zealand society would not be well served by such an outcome, and 
nor would intergovernmental relations between the two countries. 
 
It is not apparent that sufficient thought has been given to the possible consequences of such a 
shift in the make-up of New Zealand’s population, or to what steps might be taken to incorporate 
and channel productively the valuable resource represented by a sizeable Chinese diaspora in 
New Zealand. This is more than a question of immigration. It has implications for a wide range of 
public policy concerns, including, but not limited to, education, health, social welfare, policing, 
housing, Maori affairs, civil aviation and tourism. These factors need to be addressed in an 
integrated and co-ordinated way, in order to maximise national benefit and to avoid the 
possibility of unintended consequences. 
 
Adjust constructively to the changing nature of China’s presence in the South Pacific 
China’s activities in New Zealand’s immediate neighbourhood, the South Pacific, present 
Wellington with a dilemma. On the one hand, the constructive engagement of the Asia-Pacific 
region’s major emerging power could contribute to the betterment of the island nations, and 
might even allow New Zealand to recalibrate some of its own approaches to assistance. On the 
other hand, China’s involvement may cut across New Zealand’s objectives in the region. A return 
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to democracy in Fiji, for instance, is not a primary concern for China, whose policy of non-
interference leads it to deal with whatever regime is in power. The efforts of New Zealand and 
Australia to bring pressure to bear on Fiji’s current power elite are rendered less effective by 
China’s political engagement and economic support for the regime. 
 
There is a concern among development experts, also, at China’s disinclination to coordinate its 
efforts with those of others, and its absence from the Cairns Compact that has donor coordination 
as its goal. The perception is that some of China’s aid in the Pacific may be inappropriate or 
poorly targeted, and that in availing themselves of the soft loans China is willing to make 
available now, island countries may be setting themselves up for a funding crisis when the loans 
fall due.  
 
New Zealand does well to maintain a close overview of China’s initiatives and activities in the 
South Pacific island states (not least because for the purposes of internal reference China 
generally expands the group to include New Zealand). It can usefully engage with China on the 
two countries’ policies towards the South Pacific, arguably the only part of the world where New 
Zealand’s perspectives may carry more insight than China’s. It can and should make 
representations seeking to modify China’s behaviour when China’s actions threaten to negate 
New Zealand’s own policy objectives, as is the case in relation to Fiji. It should work 
constructively with China in order to maximise the effectiveness of development assistance in the 
South Pacific, including by continuing to encourage China to associate itself with the Cairns 
Compact. 
 
What New Zealand should avoid is to impose upon the island nations its preconceptions of how 
their relationships with China might best be managed. Apart from the fact that such action is 
likely to be counterproductive, these are judgements best left to the countries concerned. If New 
Zealand is able to help inform those judgements by providing information or advice upon 
request, that may be a helpful intervention, but the choices are otherwise for the island 
governments to make in the light of their own perception of their circumstances. 
 
Seek to anticipate the roles that China and the United States will play long-term in the Asia-
Pacific region, and set policy courses that take into account that shifting relationship 
If New Zealand were to be faced tomorrow with a stark choice between throwing its lot 
in with the United States or with China, there is little doubt that it would choose the United 
States. History, language, culture, values, all point in that direction, as does New Zealand’s close 
association with Australia, a staunch United States ally. The United States remains the main 
security guarantor of the Asia-Pacific region, the US dollar the global medium of exchange. New 
Zealand’s decision would be made the easier by the charm offensive accompanying the United 
States’ current ‘pivot’ towards the Asia-Pacific. New Zealand politicians, and New Zealanders 
generally, feel flattered to be invited to re-enter the American fold, albeit as a ‘strategic partner’ 
rather than, as formerly, a formal ally. 
 
Longer term, however, the situation becomes less clear. The United States has many 
preoccupations, and its re-balancing may alter. For China, on the other hand, such a re-balancing 
is not an option: it is an integral part of the region. China will be of central economic importance 
to New Zealand, and to the world. Its military capabilities will have grown. A combination of 
economic logic and traditional patterns of association will have caused many of its Southeast 
Asian neighbours to give China’s view greater weight. New Zealand itself will have acquired a 
greater Asian dimension, through immigration, investment and trade, and other forms of 
interchange. At that point, the political downside of giving priority to the political and economic 
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relationship with China would be greatly reduced, and the practical imperatives in favour could 
be telling. 
 
It is unlikely that New Zealand will in fact face a need to choose definitively in favour of one 
protagonist or the other. The chances are much greater that it will face a series of smaller 
judgement calls, as the established power and the pretender jostle for power and influence. It will 
be important to make those judgements in the light of an informed evaluation of where New 
Zealand’s real interests lie, rather than as an instinctive vote of support for a traditional friend, or 
a speculative investment in a promising new partner. 
  
It would be overstating the case to suggest a possible role for New Zealand as an intermediary as 
the United States and China pull and haul in the course of redefining their relationship and areas 
of interest. To the extent that the two fail to agree, it will not be because of failures to 
communicate, or a lack of understanding as to what the other is trying to achieve – rather the 
reverse. New Zealand has no special insights or standing with the parties that would fit it for the 
role of broker.  
 
Such limited influence as New Zealand does possess relates less to the way China and the United 
States deal with one another than to the regional context in which those dealings take place. New 
Zealand does have a voice in determining the shape and the scope of regional institutions, and it 
can use that voice to advantage in seeking to shape the environment in a positive way. One 
worthwhile objective, under present circumstances, would be to ensure that China is not denied a 
seat at the table in regional groupings. It was, for instance, a helpful intervention for New 
Zealand’s trade minister to make it clear that New Zealand would not wish to be part of a Trans 
Pacific Partnership if it would have the effect of isolating China. 
 
As New Zealand follows a foreign policy line that does not accord wholly with either United 
States or Chinese imperatives, it should do so in the knowledge that its search for the middle 
ground will not necessarily recommend itself to either of the major powers. The United States has 
not in the past shown itself much in favour of nuanced positions, tending rather to divide the 
world into those who support it and those who do not. It is a fair assumption that Australia will 
for the foreseeable future continue to accord the Americans something close to unconditional 
support. To the extent that New Zealand falls short of that mark, its stated strategic goal of 
realising ‘a highly trusted political and security relationship with the United States’ will be 
rendered more difficult.  
 
Nor can it be assumed that China will be greatly sympathetic to a small state’s disposition to 
pursue its own destiny. The PRC has consistently demonstrated a willingness to bring heavy 
pressure to bear on countries that fail to endorse policies important to it. Its readiness to use 
diplomatic and economic levers is unlikely to lessen as China’s grasp on those levers becomes 
more assured. Martin Jacques has raised the spectre of New Zealand (and Australia) becoming 
economically so dependent on China that they become in effect vassal states. Even if that extreme 
situation is avoided, it is very likely that in years to come China will exercise a significant level of 
economic influence over New Zealand, and that it will not feel constrained from bringing that 
influence to bear when it thinks the circumstances warrant it. 
 
Pursue, but not allow itself to be limited by, close cooperation with Australia 
In spite of the United States’ concern to shore up its influence in the region, it is likely to 
be New Zealand’s relationship with Australia, rather than the United States, that requires to be 
handled most carefully in the context of enhanced links with China. Australia’s preference will be 
for New Zealand to develop its policies towards China in close harmony with Australia’s own. 
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Given the existence of some differences in the two countries’ interests, and in particular 
Australia’s closer military and security ties to the United States, this has the potential to 
complicate New Zealand’s preferred lines of policy development. The situation is one that will 
require to be handled with considerable finesse, especially since the comprehensive nature of the 
New Zealand/Australia bilateral relationship gives ample scope for Australia to bring pressure to 
bear should it form the view that New Zealand’s strategic direction could pose a threat to 
Australian interests. At the same time it needs to be born in mind that it is New Zealand’s status 
as a developed country, including its association with Australia (and the United States), that 
underpins much of the value that China sees in taking relations with New Zealand a step further 
than it does with many other countries.  
 
Keep under constant review relations with other countries in Asia, and with Europe 
Adding to the complexities of New Zealand foreign policy decision-making in the 
decades ahead is the fact that it is not just New Zealand that will face the need for constant 
reassessment and rebalancing. The dilemma is one that will to a greater or lesser degree confront 
all the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. The relatively stable and predictable situation that has 
prevailed for the past 40 years is likely to give way to one of shifting allegiances and alignments. 
New Zealand will find itself framing its policies in a more fluid and risky environment.  
 
The rebalancing imperative will apply particularly to the countries of Southeast Asia, 
traditionally the swing states of Asia. But it has relevance too for the big countries of North and 
South Asia – for South Korea, historically often a vassal state of China, for Japan, and for India. 
These are all countries of considerable economic importance to New Zealand, and India in 
particular is second only to China in terms of its potential for growth over the next two decades. 
New Zealand cannot afford to become so preoccupied with the claims of China and the United 
States that it allows its relationships with the other major powers in the region to fall away. These 
are relationships that are important now, and that will in the future have much to offer in terms 
of spreading economic risk, and providing a broadly based strategic perspective. 
 
Looking further afield, New Zealand should resist any inclination to disengage from Europe. 
Even if the EU as an entity remains preoccupied with domestic exigencies in the years ahead, and 
even if its member states are not uniformly adroit in managing their dealings with the Asian 
region, Europe and the EU should remain an integral part of New Zealand’s vision over the next 
20 years. Historical and cultural links aside, this is the market that New Zealand has expended so 
much diplomatic effort to protect over the past 40 years, and that investment deserves to be 
protected. The EU will continue to be of fundamental importance to New Zealand’s economic 
well-being as an established and reliable market for the goods New Zealand produces most 
competitively. The values it promotes internationally will continue to be closely aligned with 
those held by New Zealand. Closer engagement with China in no way implies a requirement to 
downgrade other, longer-standing relationships. Entering a more challenging future, New 
Zealand would be well advised to continue to devote resources and energy to maintaining solid 
links with Europe. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Viewing events in a 20-year time frame has the advantage of by-passing short term 
uncertainties in favour of long-term trends. Conclusions can never be more than a balance of 
probabilities, but they provide a base, however qualified, for planning how a small country like 
New Zealand can best seek to accommodate itself to emerging global realities. 
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The analysis in this paper suggests that by around 2030 China will be the world’s largest 
economy. It will be a central player in world trade and global financial markets. Its political 
system will have become somewhat less authoritarian, but it will not have evolved into anything 
resembling a Western liberal democracy. While China will have the capacity to deploy a modern, 
regionally-focussed defence force, it is unlikely to have moved beyond that to a capability for 
global power projection. 
 
In its international dealings, China will stand with the United States as one of the two dominant 
powers in the Asia-Pacific region. To a greater or less degree, it will compete with the United 
States for power and influence in the region and globally. In its own neighbourhood, China will 
exercise strong influence through a complex network of economic ties, and through the exercise 
of both hard and soft diplomacy. It will play a central role in regional and international 
organisations, on the basis of norms and codes of practice that China has helped to shape. 
 
China’s prosperity and economic power will be important factors in New Zealand’s economic 
development. It will be among New Zealand’s biggest markets and sources of imports. It will be 
a key contributor to New Zealand’s earnings from education and tourism, and a logical 
investment destination for New Zealand companies wanting to expand their manufacturing base. 
In regional terms, the Chinese economy will be the locomotive of growth for countries 
throughout the Asia-Pacific, an indispensable market, central to closely linked manufacturing 
and supply chains, and the key driver of regional economic policies. These outcomes are the 
easier to predict because they are largely already upon us.  
 
New Zealand will be the better off for China’s rise. Its economy will benefit both from direct 
interaction with China, and from the growing levels of prosperity that China’s rise will deliver to 
the region more generally. Nonetheless, China’s economic strength, and the political power 
consequent upon it, will place New Zealand in a much more complex international environment 
that it has previously experienced. New Zealand will find it necessary to manage the competing 
claims and values of China and the United States, to deal with the shifting judgements and 
loyalties of other Asia-Pacific countries facing the same dilemma, and to accommodate 
Australian policies at times at odds with its own. 
 
In navigating these uncharted waters, New Zealand’s best course is likely to be to build upon the 
qualities of adaptability and appropriate modesty that have characterised its external dealings up 
to the present. New Zealand has prided itself on a diplomatic style that favours cooperation, 
problem-solving, respect for the other party, and honesty. In the future, as in the past, these are 
likely to be the qualities that advance New Zealand’s interests most effectively. In dealing with 
an increasingly powerful China, New Zealand should proceed (the words are Michael Green’s) 
by ‘careful strategizing, thoughtful setting of objectives, persistent and often creative advocacy, 
and nimble deployment of professional skills’.  
  
 
 
 
